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The UK’s European diplomatic strategy for Brexit and beyond 
RICHARD G. WHITMAN1 
 
Brexit and the new strategic challenge 
The UK’s departure from the EU represents a major shift in the diplomatic strategy of one of 
Europe’s leading economic, diplomatic and security players. The referendum in June 2016, 
the subsequent domestic political dislocation caused by the vote in favour of leaving the EU, 
and the Brexit negotiation process have absorbed a great deal of political energy and 
diplomatic bandwidth, crowding out consideration of the UK’s European foreign policy after 
Brexit. 
The UK’s departure from the EU raises questions about the scale, scope and direction of the 
European component of the UK’s future foreign, security and defence policy. In reporting on 
a recent inquiry, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons noted that the 
overall goals and specifics of UK foreign policy in Europe after Brexit were still to be 
detailed by the UK government.2 Further, a recognition that withdrawal from the EU has 
implications for Britain’s broader international role has been seen in a flurry of reflection on 
the future direction of the country’s foreign policy.3 Since the referendum, the UK 
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1 The author would like to convey thanks to the anonymous reviewers of International Affairs 
and Heidi Maurer for their insightful comments which greatly improved the analysis 
presented in this article. 
2 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The future of UK diplomacy in Europe, 
2nd Report of Session 2017–19, HC514 (London: Stationery Office, 30 Jan. 2018),  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/514/514.pdf. (Unless 
otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 2 Feb. 
2019.) 
3 For the most developed of these assessments, see David Owen and David Ludlow, British 
foreign policy after Brexit: an independent voice (London: Biteback, 2017); John Bew and 
Gabriel Elefteriu, Making sense of British foreign policy after Brexit: some early thoughts, 
Britain in World Project (London: Policy Exchange, July 2016), 
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government has adopted the slogan ‘Global Britain’ to signify that leaving the EU does not 
diminish the degree of Britain’s international engagement. However, in leaving the EU the 
UK is undertaking a major strategic readjustment in the European diplomatic strategy that it 
has pursued since the 1970s. 
Brexit takes place within a broader environment of significant change in global politics which 
was already requiring the UK to adjust its grand strategy.4 The election of Donald Trump to 
the US presidency, on the heels of the Brexit vote, has exacerbated the uncertainty 
surrounding British foreign policy.5 With the Trump administration challenging key tenets of 
postwar US global strategy, including security alliance commitments and America’s role as 
the progenitor and protector of the liberal international economic order, the UK faces an 
existential challenge to the central purposes of its most important bilateral relationship.6 
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https://www.policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/british-foreign-policy-after-
brexit-policy-exchange-briefing-july-2016.pdf; Malcolm Chalmers, UK foreign and security 
policy after Brexit, briefing paper (London: Royal United Services Institute, Jan. 2017), 
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_bp_uk_foreign_and_security_policy_after_brexit_v
4.pdf; Simon Fraser, Can the UK retain global influence after Brexit? Policies and structure 
for a new era (London: Policy Institute, King’s College London, Jan. 2017), 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/publications/can-the-uk-retain-global-influence-
after-brexit.pdf; James Rogers, Towards ‘Global Britain’: challenging the new narratives of 
national decline (London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017), 
https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/towards-global-britain-challenging-the-new-
narratives-of-national-decline/. 
4 Doug Stokes and Richard G. Whitman, ‘Transatlantic triage? European and UK grand 
strategy after the US rebalance to Asia’, International Affairs 89: 5, Sept. 2013, pp. 1087–
1107; David Blagden, ‘Global multipolarity, European security and implications for UK 
grand strategy: back to the future, once again’, International Affairs 91: 2, March 2015, pp. 
333–50; Paul Cornish and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Smart muddling through: rethinking UK 
national strategy beyond Afghanistan’, International Affairs 88: 2, March 2012, pp. 213–22. 
5 Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, ‘Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy?’, 
International Affairs 93: 5, Sept. 2017, pp. 1013–38. 
6 Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump’, 
International Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 63–80; Nana de Graaff and Bastiaan van 
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Together, Brexit and the vicissitudes of the Trump administration are potentially mortal 
blows to the central organizing idea of British foreign policy, that of being a bridge between 
Europe and the United States.7 With future relationships at both ends of that bridge uncertain, 
the UK faces a high degree of dislocation in the arrangements that have anchored its 
European, transatlantic and international diplomatic strategy for over half a century.8 
The article is the author’s companion piece to the analysis published in International Affairs 
nearly two years ago, which focused on the continuity and change apparent in Britain’s 
European diplomatic strategy in advance of the referendum vote.9 This piece extends and 
updates the analysis to argue that after Brexit the EU–UK relationship will be the most 
significant determinant for the future of the UK’s European foreign policy.10 The UK’s 
relationship to NATO, which is the other central component of the country’s European 
diplomatic strategy, has been explored at length recently in this journal and elsewhere,11 and 
will not be examined here.  
The article argues, first, that the UK’s future relationship with the EU will condition the UK’s 
broader diplomatic approach to Europe; second, that exit from the EU will also entail a 
recalibration of the ambitions and modalities of the UK’s other bilateral and multilateral 
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Apeldoorn, ‘The US–China power shift and the end of Pax Americana’, International Affairs 
94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 113–32. 
7 The collapse of this bridge was declared over a decade ago in a characteristically incisive 
analysis by William Wallace, ‘The collapse of British foreign policy’, International Affairs 
81: 1, Jan. 2005, pp. 53–68.  
8 Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams, ‘Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future 
of the US–EU and US–UK relationships’, International Affairs 92: 3, July 2016, pp. 547–67; 
Jamie Gaskarth, ‘Strategizing Britain’s role in the world’, International Affairs 90: 3, May 
2014, pp. 559–81. 
9 Richard G. Whitman, ‘Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK’s European diplomatic 
strategy?’, International Affairs 92: 3, May 2016, pp. 509–29. 
10 A European diplomatic strategy is understood as the strategic objectives that have informed 
the UK’s European foreign policy: see Anthony Forster and Alasdair Blair, The making of 
Britain’s European foreign policy (London: Longman, 2002). 
11 Oliver and Williams, ‘Special relationships in flux’; David Hastings Dunn and Mark 
Webber, ‘The UK, the European Union and NATO: Brexit’s unintended 
consequences’, Global Affairs 2: 5, 2016, pp. 471–80. 
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relationships in Europe. The challenge for the UK will be to manage the rebalancing of its 
diplomacy in Europe to establish the more polycentric diplomacy required of a non-EU state. 
With the UK government having struggled since June 2016 to provide comprehensive detail 
on its ambitions for its future economic, political and security relationship with the EU, the 
development of the broader aspects of the UK’s post-Brexit European diplomatic strategy has 
been retarded. However, through analysis of key speeches, government white papers, and 
other supporting documents and statements (and the experience of negotiating Brexit with the 
EU27), the outlines of a nascent post-Brexit UK European diplomatic strategy can be 
discerned. Furthermore, the experience of negotiating Brexit has been instructive in respect 
of the UK’s capacity for influence on the EU as a third country.  
Brexit and Europe’s international relations 
In departing from the EU, the UK is going against the grain of major trends within Europe’s 
political-economic, diplomatic and security order. Since the early 1990s the EU has become a 
major constituent of the governance of Europe’s international relations. Through the 
processes of membership enlargement, the expansion of the scope of European integration to 
include monetary union (through the creation of the euro), the abolition of border controls 
through the Schengen Agreement, and the quest to further deepen the rules and regulation of 
the single market, the EU has become the fulcrum of Europe’s political economy. Through 
membership conditionality, enlargement negotiations, a role in the western Balkans and 
neighbourhood policies to cover European non-member states, the EU has also become an 
increasingly significant European diplomatic actor.12 
The EU’s centrality to Europe’s security order has been demonstrated in the past ten years 
through its responses to the global financial crisis (and its approach to managing the eurozone 
member economies and their government debts), Europe’s migration crisis and the contest 
with Russia for influence in eastern Europe. The EU and its member states effected, to an 
increasing degree, the major challenges to European security in the past three decades.  
The departure of the UK from the EU has a dislocating effect for the EU, for its 27 remaining 
member states, for non-EU European states and for Europe’s political economy and its 
diplomatic and security order. The degree of impact will depend heavily on the degree to 
which the post-Brexit EU–UK relationship is complementary to the current relationships 
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12 Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds, International relations 
and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
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between the UK and the EU’s other 27 member states. Inevitably, in its new status as a non-
EU member state, the UK’s wider European interests and ambitions will be recalibrated.  
Hitherto, there has been relatively little consideration of the UK’s post-Brexit European 
strategy, or of the implications of withdrawal for the remaining EU member states.13 This is 
primarily because of the understandable focus on the complexities and vicissitudes of the 
UK’s difficulties in negotiating its withdrawal. Furthermore, the election of President Trump 
and the implications of the policy and practice of his administration for the UK and Europe 
have also vied for attention as a pressing challenge to be addressed. Both the EU and UK–US 
relations have been key determinants of the UK’s past European strategy. Both will be 
important determinants of the UK’s future European strategy. However, as this article 
demonstrates, the key drivers at present are the UK’s domestic political dynamic and the 
Article 50 negotiation process.  
Interregnum in the EU–UK relationship: transition and recalibration  
In the period since the referendum result the UK has struggled to define the outlines of a 
strategy that squares the domestic political turmoil created by the vote with the essential 
requirement that a large European-based nation-state have a coherent policy approach 
towards its neighbouring states.14 The UK’s EU partners have also struggled to come to terms 
with a referendum result that they have found incomprehensible and have fully expected to 
see reversed.  
For the UK, the dislocating effect of the referendum has been to confront the country with a 
major national strategic policy shift for which no prior preparation had been made. Over 40 
years of participation in what is now the EU had seen the UK embedded in processes of 
formal and informal integration with its neighbouring states, their economies and their 
societies, with extensive economic, political, legal, social and public policy impacts. In the 
aftermath of the referendum result the Conservative-led government (after changing its leader 
following the resignation of David Cameron), re-elected in May 2017, has maintained the 
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13 For notable exceptions, see Tim Oliver, ed., Europe’s Brexit (London: Agenda, 2018); 
Simon Duke, Will Brexit damage our security and defence? The impact on the EU and the 
UK (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Christopher Hill, The future of British foreign 
policy, security and diplomacy in a world after Brexit (Cambridge: Polity, 2019). 
14 Anand Menon and Jean-Paul Salter, ‘Brexit: initial reflections’ International Affairs 92: 6, 
Nov. 2016, pp. 1297–1318. 
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position that the public vote is to be interpreted as requiring UK withdrawal from the EU 
rather than the revision of the terms of UK membership.15 
The UK’s Brexit negotiations, explored below, have presented considerable challenges for 
the country. In seeking to negotiate the terms of Britain’s exit from the EU, the government 
maintained a public stance up to a late stage in the Article 50 negotiations that a ‘no deal’ 
Brexit was an outcome that it was willing to contemplate.16 However, a ‘no deal’ Brexit 
would see EU–UK relations descend into recrimination and rancour, and would have a 
significant impact on the challenges for UK diplomacy in Europe. It would also be likely to 
confront the UK with a ‘two union’ problem, in that a breakdown in the relationship with the 
EU would trigger tensions within the union of the United Kingdom. A no deal Brexit would 
be likely to trigger moves in Scotland for a new independence referendum, introduce 
significant political tension in Northern Ireland, and raise significant difficulties in the 
relationship between Cardiff and London. In such circumstances, assessing the future 
trajectory of the UK’s European diplomatic strategy would be problematic. 
The EU–UK agreement of 14 November 2018 on a withdrawal agreement, and an 
accompanying political declaration on their future relationship, provided for the formalities 
of the UK’s departure from the EU.17 Getting this agreement ratified by the UK parliament 
presented the May government with a formidable challenge, leading to a political drama with 
high stakes that remained unresolved at the time of writing in early February 2019. Only once 
the withdrawal agreement has been ratified can the UK enter into the period of formal 
transition with the EU, scheduled to last until at least the end of 2020.18 
The transition period represents an interval of time in which the EU and the UK will 
recalibrate their future relationship. For the EU, the UK becomes a third country and EU–UK 
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15 See the 2017 Conservative general election manifesto: Forward together: the Conservative 
manifesto (London, 2017), https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto.  
16 ‘Cabinet clashes over May’s refusal to rule out no deal’, Financial Times, 22 Jan. 2019, 
https://www.ft.com/content/e7f83628-1e53-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65. 
17 Department for Exiting the European Union, Withdrawal agreement and political 
declaration on the future relationship between the UK and the EU as endorsed by leaders at 
a special meeting of the European Council on 25 November 2018 (London, 2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/withdrawal-agreement-and-political-
declaration. 
18 There is provision within the withdrawal agreement to extend this period until 2022. 
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relations become a new strand of the EU’s existing set of external relationships. Beyond the 
change in the formal status of the UK in relation to the EU, there will also be a reconstituting 
of the relationship which will have effects on both sides. In terms of the UK’s European 
strategy, the period will be an interregnum, in which the UK no longer participates in the 
EU’s decision-making structures but remains bound by the EU’s policies and its body of law. 
For the EU, there are both extra-EU and intra-EU effects. A key extra-EU effect is that the 
exit of a large country from the EU’s membership universe is a striking reversal of the 
otherwise unidirectional narrative of European integration, which has seen an ever-increasing 
number of states becoming members and a shrinking body of European nation-states outside 
the EU. In negotiating the UK’s exit from the EU, there has been minimal reflection on the 
geopolitical consequences of Brexit for the EU’s position in Europe or internationally, with a 
striking lack of weighty critical reflection on possible consequences either in Brussels or in 
EU member-state capitals. At a minimum, the UK’s departure might be expected to trigger 
some critical reflection on the impact on the EU’s international ambitions and an acceleration 
towards achieving its goal of ‘strategic autonomy’, as set out in its ‘global strategy’.19  
The intra-EU effects of the UK’s departure are also still to be determined. Each successive 
enlargement of the EU has seen significant impacts on decision-taking, policy development 
and the deepening of European integration. Similarly, a de-enlargement process that sees a 
significant and influential member state departing the EU will have impacts on voting and 
decision-taking, coalitions for policy advocacy and the constituency of member states 
championing (or resisting) greater ambitions for integration.  
Unless the decision to leave the EU is reversed, the UK will move from influencing the 
direction of the EU as a member state insider to seeking to have impact as a third-party 
outsider. With departure from the EU, the UK policy of seeking to influence the agenda of 
European integration through membership, sustained over nearly half a century, comes to an 
end. In its place the UK’s European diplomatic strategy is recalibrated, with Britain’s EU 
diplomacy repurposed to maximize influence on the EU as an outsider while also pursuing a 
broader European diplomatic strategy both bilaterally and multilaterally. The degree of 
continuity or change after Brexit will be conditional on the extent to which the UK diverges 
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19 Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European 




from its current policy synchronicity with the EU, and on the UK’s broader global strategy 
objectives.  
As an EU member state, the UK has participated in a wide range of policies and a set of 
institutional arrangements to structure its relationships with 27 other member states, third 
countries and international organizations. EU membership also provided an organizing 
framework for a range of external relations both within and beyond the EU, covering foreign 
economic policy, foreign and security policy (including some defence components), 
international development policy and broader foreign policy issues. Each of the various 
strands of the UK’s external relations will go through a redefinition process as the UK 
determines the extent to which its policies will be aligned with EU positions and the extent to 
which they are pursued in partnership with the EU.  
The degree to which the UK acts in concert with the EU in Europe and beyond will be, in 
significant part, conditioned by the nature of the EU–UK trading relationship and also by the 
terms of the post-Brexit EU–UK foreign and security partnership. The transition period 
negotiated with the EU allows for a ‘rolling over’ of UK participation in existing EU third-
party agreements until the end of 2020. For the UK, a major preoccupation in the transition 
period—alongside relearning its relationship with the EU—will be the need to devote 
considerable resources to simply recodifying the status quo in its trade relationships with 
third countries and international organizations that are currently governed via EU 
arrangements. The EU–UK relationship planned for the transition period in foreign, security 
and defence policy highlights the changed status of the UK in an area in which it has been a 
lead actor. During the transition period the UK will not take part in the other member states’ 
collective discussions on major foreign policy issues, but it will be bound by decisions taken 
by the EU27: the EU’s conception of transition is for the UK to be outside EU decision-
making bodies but bound by their collective positions. The UK will also cease to be directly 
involved in decisions on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); it has 
already removed itself from the roster of the EU’s battlegroups and relinquished the provision 
of the operational headquarters for the EU’s anti-piracy Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR 
Somalia).  
Brexit: lessons from the negotiations 
The EU’s approach to the June 2016 vote has been to combine an expectation that the Brexit 
decision would be reversed with a negotiating position intended to preserve the European 
integration process. The response to past national referendums which have rejected EU 
agreements has been to clarify and repackage proposals to facilitate another public vote. This 
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approach was adopted for the Maastricht, Nice and Lisbon treaties. In the case of the UK, 
however, the EU has been confronted with a government which is not seeking to work 
around a negative referendum result in such a way as to remain within the European 
integration project. Thus the British referendum result has presented the EU with a new 
challenge, that of the first member state seeking withdrawal. The most appropriate 
comparison for Brexit is the June 1966 announcement by President de Gaulle of France’s 
intention to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command structure.20 As with Brexit, 
there were portents that a point of rupture was in prospect, but also that the decision on 
departure was an organization-shaping event.  
The UK referendum result took place against a backdrop of major and ongoing crises for the 
EU, including the challenges presented by the global financial crisis, the challenge to the 
integrity of the eurozone presented by Greece, and the major border management challenge 
posed by the migration crisis of 2015, which itself called into question the maintenance of the 
Schengen zone. Brexit, which was seen as a self-inflicted crisis for the UK, became an 
additional test for the EU in collective crisis management. The strategy adopted by the EU in 
the negotiations has been to treat the UK as a country running a cycle of the EU’s 
enlargement negotiation process in reverse, and thereby as a third-country negotiating partner 
which has a limited range of models to choose from in its future relationship with the EU. 
This strategy is fully commensurate with a desire on the EU’s part to preserve the integrity of 
the EU’s economic, political and legal order. This may, however, be to misread the 
consequences of Brexit for the EU, in that the UK presents a potential challenger model that 
other European states may consider. In the short term, and as a consequence of the UK’s 
dysfunctional approach towards the Brexit negotiations, this challenger model is rather 
unattractive. However, if the cost of Brexit for the UK is not significant economic hardship or 
a profound downgrading of diplomatic, security and defence capabilities, it represents an 
alternative trajectory to EU membership for nation-states in Europe.  
Learning by doing: negotiating as a third party 
The style adopted by the UK for the negotiations was to couch its objectives in terms of ‘red 
lines’ from which it would not depart. These had the effect of circumscribing the substance of 
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20 The need to manage President de Gaulle required NATO to modify its operation even in 
advance of the decision to withdraw; see Christian Nuenlist, ‘Dealing with the Devil: NATO 
and Gaullist France 1958-1966’, Special Issue: Cold War maverick: France and NATO, 
1946–1991, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9:3, 2011. 220-231. 
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the negotiations but also setting their tone and tenor.21 The EU interpreted the red lines as 
delineating the UK’s access to the single market and the trade relationship that could exist 
between the EU and the UK.22 The costs and benefits of existing EU–third country 
relationships were presented in stark clarity by the EU as well as being rehearsed at length in 
the British discussion on Brexit.23 Within the UK, the choice of relationship was presented in 
terms of a spectrum between the position of Norway, as a member of the European Economic 
Area (EEA), and that of Canada, with its Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
with the EU (with multiple pluses added to signify an even more comprehensive deal). 
The Article 50 negotiation process between the UK and the EU has been the mechanism 
through which both parties have channelled the re-ordering of their relationship. A key 
characteristic of the Brexit negotiations was that the remaining 27 member states constructed 
and maintained a process that has seen the UK treated as a third country. Thus the EU27 
insisted on declining to negotiate on the post-Brexit EU–UK relationship until all the issues 
related to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU had been settled. This sequential approach to 
EU–UK negotiations also had the effect of baulking consideration of the broader geopolitical 
implications of a significant European nation-state detaching itself from a major regional 
multilateral organisation. 
The UK preference was to see the withdrawal negotiations conducted in parallel with 
negotiations on a future relationship. This was resisted by the EU, and the UK acquiesced in 
a set of sequenced three-phased set of negotiations (with movement from each phase 
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21 ‘Theresa May straddles her red lines in search of a Brexit deal’, Financial Times, 14 Oct. 
2018, https://www.ft.com/content/52e20306-cfa3-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5. 
22 European Council, Directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from 
the European Union (Brussels, 22 May 2017), 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-negotiation-xt21016-
ad01re02en17.pdf. 
23 European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations 
with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, Slide presented by Michel Barnier, 
European Commission chief negotiator, to the heads of state and government at the 




requiring progress objectives to be met) covering, in order, the withdrawal agreement; a 
temporary transition period; and the post-transitional future EU–UK relationship.24 In 
addition to the negotiations on the sequencing of negotiations, there were also disputes on 
what issues need to be resolved during the withdrawal phase of the negotiations, and how 
these issues were to be handled where there was a degree of linkage to issues of substance in 
the negotiations on the future EU–UK relationship. Two of these substantive issues were the 
treatment of EU citizens resident in the UK and UK nationals resident in other member 
states, and the status of the North–South border in Ireland.  
The structured EU–UK negotiation process consisted of face-to-face meetings between the 
negotiation principals and technical work between those sessions. For the EU side, its 
negotiator Michel Barnier reported on progress via an EU27 configuration of member states. 
The negotiations were punctuated with European Council meetings held as EU27 and as 
EU28.25 The latter were used to take stock with the UK Prime Minister but have also 
signalled progress (or, in the case of the Salzburg European Council in September 2018, to 
demonstrate impasse) in the negotiations. A particular concern for the EU during the 
negotiations was the lack of a detailed blueprint from the UK on its ambitions for a future 
EU–UK relationship. This lacuna was eventually filled by the Chequers paper, which 
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24 European Council, Special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017)—
guidelines, EUCO XT 20004/17 (Brussels, 29 April 2017), 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21763/29-euco-art50-guidelinesen.pdf; Terms of 
reference for the Article 50 TEU negotiations (Brussels, 19 June 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-uk-art-50-terms-
reference_agreed_amends_en.pdf. 
25 For an extremely useful overview of the EU’s structure and approach to the Article 50 
negotiations, see Oliver Patel, The EU and the Brexit negotiations: institutions, strategies and 
objectives, Brexit Insights (London: University College London European Institute, Oct. 
2018), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/sites/european-
institute/files/eu_and_the_brexit_negotiations.pdf. See also European Council, Council 
decision authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland for an agreement setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from 
the European Union (Brussels, 15 May 2017), 
 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-21016-2017-INIT/en/pdf. 
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received an unenthusiastic reception from the EU and conflicted with the EU’s own 
objectives for the phase of negotiations on the future EU–UK relationship.26  
The UK faced different constraints from the EU in respect of its room for manoeuvre in 
determining its position for the Brexit negotiations. The EU concern was to preserve the 
unanimity of the member states behind its negotiating position. For the UK, Prime Minister 
Theresa May faced the challenge of managing her Conservative Party’s expectation of a 
timetable that would see a swift exit from the EU but with no party consensus on the nature 
of the post-Brexit EU–UK relationship. The UK also faced the challenge of negotiating a 
previously untested process providing for the withdrawal of a member state from the Union. 
Moreover, it was facing as its negotiating partner the European Commission, a body 
equipped with a high degree of experience and expertise in negotiating with third countries 
on the terms of their relationship to the EU’s single market and regulatory regime.  
Entering EU purgatory 
The framework for the negotiations, as set out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, 
was set out in detail in five paragraphs that determined the timetable, the modalities for the 
negotiation, their content and the process of ratification for an agreement. A key 
characteristic of Article 50 is that, from the point of formal notification by a country of its 
intention to withdraw from the EU, its negotiations for withdrawal are conducted with the 
same modalities as EU negotiations with third countries. Consequently, in formally triggering 
Brexit in March 2017 the UK entered into a period of EU ‘purgatory’ with a two-year fixed 
timetable to make the transition from full member to third country.27 While negotiating the 
arrangements for its withdrawal, the UK remained a member of the EU for all other purposes 
(excepting the deliberations by the other EU member states on the UK’s withdrawal) Article 
50 also provided for the withdrawal negotiations to take account of the framework of the 
future relationship between the EU and the UK. This important corollary, while both sensible 
and logical, presented the UK with the significant challenge of defining its ideal future non-
member-state relationship with the EU following a referendum process which had divided the 
electorate and political parties, and had seen majority support for remaining within the EU in 
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26 European Council, European Council (Art. 50) (23 March 2018) Guidelines, EUCO XT 
20001/18 (Brussels, 23 March 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33458/23-
euco-art50-guidelines.pdf. 
27 Assuming that no recourse is had to the Article 50 provisions allowing for an extension of 
the negotiating period. 
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Scotland and Northern Ireland, alongside majority support for leaving in England and Wales. 
Further, throughout the Article 50 negotiating process, a Remain/Leave divide has endured as 
the prism through which much of UK politics has been conducted. 
UK Brexit hardware 
The UK government was to find it somewhat easier to put in place the ‘hardware’ to facilitate 
the definition of a detailed UK Brexit policy and negotiation machinery than to build the 
‘software’ of detailed government policy on the ambitions for the negotiations, which 
emerged much more belatedly.28 The Prime Minister moved swiftly to put in place the civil 
service structures for negotiating withdrawal with the creation of two new government 
ministries: the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU), to oversee the EU exit 
negotiations and to establish a new EU–UK relationship, and the Department for 
International Trade (DIT), responsible for developing a post-Brexit trade policy and reaching 
trade agreements with countries other than EU member states.29 In simultaneously creating 
both of these new ministries, the government signalled that its future European strategy was 
to seek a new basis for UK–EU relations, and to pursue a new direction for its foreign 
economic policy outside EU trade policy. The creation of a new department to oversee what 
would inevitably be complex negotiations with the EU, rather than placing these with the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), required initial staffing to be drawn from the 
Europe Directorate of the FCO, the UK’s Permanent Representation to the EU and the 
Cabinet Office’s Europe Unit.30 The FCO retained its responsibilities for the EU’s external 
relations. Whether this arrangement was the most effective structure for negotiating Brexit 
was debated as Whitehall grappled with the complexity of negotiating a deal with the EU and 
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preparing for Brexit.31 Command and control of the negotiations remained with the Prime 
Minister and a cabinet committee created to oversee the process of the negotiations.32 
UK Brexit software 
Writing the software to determine a British position on the UK’s future relationship with the 
EU represented a more challenging process. Over six months elapsed before the UK 
government started to publicly elaborate its negotiating objectives for Brexit and for the 
future EU–UK relationship with a set of speeches from early 2017 onwards, a white paper in 
February 2017 and the formal letter providing notice to invoke Article 50, which was 
delivered on 29 March 2017.33  
Mrs May’s statement that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ seemed initially to elevate tautology to the 
status of a guiding idea as the government struggled to organize a strategy for a UK exit from 
the EU.34 More developed software gradually emerged from key speeches delivered by the 
Prime Minister and other ministers (notably the Foreign Secretary and Brexit Secretary) and 
government policy documents (notably seven ‘future partnership’ papers). Importantly, each 
strand of the European strategy has been tied to an elaboration of the component parts of the 
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May government’s ‘Global Britain’ vision. Key speeches were delivered at Lancaster House 
on 17 January 2017, to the Munich Security Conference on 17 February 2017 and in Florence 
on 22 September 2017. Each contained repeated statements on the political economy, 
security and architectural components of the nascent post-Brexit European strategy.35 The 
UK’s key objective for the post-Brexit relationship was for the EU and the UK to have a 
‘deep and special partnership’ in economic and security cooperation. The basis for the 
economic cooperation would be an ‘ambitious economic partnership’ that would see the UK 
outside the EU’s single market and its customs union, and consequently outside the EU’s 
foreign economic relations and its existing trade agreements with third countries.  
The centrepiece of the Florence speech was the proposal for ‘a new relationship on 
security’—a ‘deep security partnership’ between the EU and the UK, underpinned by a 
‘security treaty’. Detailed UK government ambitions for the broader foreign policy, internal 
and external security, and defence policy relationship had been published ten days earlier in 
two of the ‘future partnership’ papers.36 Both of these position papers stressed the degree to 
which the UK and EU shared values, objectives and threat perceptions. The thrust of the 
argument was that the UK had much to lose from being more detached from the EU. May’s 
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_a_future_partnership_paper.PDF; Foreign policy, defence and development: a future 




Munich Security Conference speech was a further high-profile reinforcement of the message 
that the UK government was seeking a degree of post-Brexit security integration that retained 
a relationship as close as possible to the current one. This ambition has been been met with a 
rigid line, conveyed by the EU’s Article 50 task force, that the UK’s status in this area would 
revert to that of a third country with no special privileges of access to EU decision-making. 
The issue of the UK’s future access to the Galileo satellite programme conveyed the EU’s 
view on the post-Brexit relationship in stark terms.37 
The most comprehensive statement of UK policy for the future EU–UK relationship was the 
July 2018 white paper on the future relationship with the EU (the Chequers paper).38 This 
was the culmination of a painstaking two-year effort by the Prime Minister to build 
consensus within her government on the outlines of the future relationship the UK wished to 
build with the EU. The Chequers paper demonstrated a high degree of consistency with the 
position articulated previously that the UK would seek a ‘pillared’ relationship with the EU, 
maintaining a security relationship as uninterrupted as possible, while maximizing the scope 
for differentiation in the political economy relationship. By presenting the security and 
economic relationships as conjoined, the Chequers paper suggested the UK still held the view 
that it could leverage better terms of access to the EU’s policy-making process than those 
prevailing for existing EU-third party relationships. The EU, for its part, has so far resisted 
any notion of privileged UK access after Brexit, even in the area of security policy where a 
loss of British involvement will have an impact on the EU.  
The political declaration (agreed with the EU in November 2018 alongside the withdrawal 
agreement) covering the future EU–UK relationship was instructive as to the UK’s difficulty 
in persuading the EU to recognize a special relationship for Britain. Despite the political 
declaration’s rhetoric on the close nature envisioned for the future relationship, the objective 
set for the negotiations is not to accord the UK a relationship with the EU that extends 
beyond those currently in existence with other third countries. Notably, the ambitions for the 
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future foreign, security and defence policy relationship do not accord any special status to the 
UK.  
Continuity and change in the UK’s European diplomatic strategy 
The detailed content of the final post-Brexit EU–UK relationship will only emerge during 
negotiations to commence after March 2019. Importantly, the nature of that future 
relationship will also be crucial in determining how the UK relates to the other EU member 
states bilaterally, trilaterally and in existing and new mini- and multilateral arrangements. 
Since June 2016 the conduct of the UK’s European strategy can be characterized as 
‘muddling through’, with the UK government having accorded a higher priority to managing 
the political divisions within the Conservative Party over the objectives for the Brexit 
negotiations than to the articulation of a comprehensive post-Brexit European strategy. The 
Brexit negotiating process has, however, provided signposts to the UK’s future European 
strategy, which blends continuity in UK objectives with the realities of re-ordered multilateral 
and bilateral relations as a former EU member state. To continue to maintain influence within 
Europe the UK will need to adopt a more polycentric approach, working in Brussels, in EU 
member-state capitals and with third countries to seek to shape EU policy from its new 
position as an outsider.  
The UK’s new indispensable partner 
The UK’s economy and security will require a focus on the EU as central to its post-Brexit 
and post-transition European diplomatic strategy. Consequently, influencing the direction and 
agenda of the EU will remain an objective for the UK after Brexit. The UK’s interests in the 
EU’s agenda will, however, be conditioned by the extent of the UK’s connections with the 
EU single market, EU trade policy and the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies.  
The political declaration on the future EU–UK relationship suggests that the EU–UK 
relationship is likely to see a range of degrees of policy convergence and divergence across 
different areas. At present it appears that the UK is seeking to adopt different approaches and 
qualitatively different depths of relationship in different policy areas. These may range from 
a high degree of convergence, for example in internal security cooperation, to a much weaker 
relationship, for example in EU moves to deepen collective economic governance, as a more 
detached observer. 
It is, however, reasonable to assume that the UK will continue to support the pre-Brexit 
strategic goals for the EU, even as a non-member state.39 This degree of continuity in 
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ambition can be illustrated by the high degree of consistency on key themes to be found in 
government documents and statements on the future EU–UK relationship, in respect of the 
following goals: 
•! for the EU to maintain and to deepen its single market as a liberalization and 
deregulation project, and its commitment to a global free trade agenda;  
•! to see an EU commitment to an ongoing programme of enlargement— especially in 
the western Balkans;  
•! for the EU to pursue the development of greater fiscal and banking-sector integration 
among the members of the eurozone to provide stability and eliminate uncertainty as 
to the viability of the monetary union;  
•! to see the EU’s foreign, (internal and external) security and defence policies develop 
in a manner that is complementary to NATO but also allows for the UK (as a third 
country with significant capabilities and major commitments to European intelligence 
and security cooperation) to participate on a basis that allows for decision-shaping 
even if outside the EU’s decision-making structures; 
•! to ensure that the UK maintains a leadership role in Europe as one of Europe’s largest 
countries, even as a non-member state.  
While maintaining these ambitious objectives, the UK will need to adopt a different approach 
to pursuing them once outside the EU. Even assuming the public decision to remain outside 
the EU is not reversed, public and parliamentary sentiment is likely to be highly influential in 
the future UK European diplomatic strategy. A ‘no deal’ Brexit caused by failure to ratify a 
withdrawal agreement is likely to lead to significant domestic political hostility towards the 
EU. Even in completing a withdrawal agreement (and gaining parliamentary approval for it), 
the UK government will face significant constraints in its negotiations on the future EU–UK 
relationship. Consequently, current and future UK governments will be keen to engage with 
the EU in a manner that minimizes the domestic political turmoil and the financial costs to 
the UK of engaging with the EU as a non-member state. A concern with ‘status issues’ in the 
EU–UK relationship, prevalent during the withdrawal negotiations, may persist in UK 
political discourse in a manner that circumscribes European strategy. Expectations that the 
post-Brexit EU–UK relationship will be a partnership of equals are likely to be dashed; the 
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relationship will, in all likelihood, be asymmetric owing to the market power exercised by the 
EU.40 
An additional key challenge for the European diplomatic strategy of the UK, as a state 
significantly invested in the European security order, is the extent to which the EU will 
deliver on its security and defence policy aspirations. Since the Brexit vote the EU has 
stepped up its work, with a new implementation plan on security and defence.41 The 
initiatives taken include the creation of a common European Defence Fund (EDF) that allows 
for co-financing from the EU budget for the member states’ joint development and 
acquisition of defence equipment and technology. There is also an intention to share defence 
spending plans through the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and to deepen 
defence cooperation through the intergovernmental agreement between 25 member states on 
permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), with the purpose of creating shared capabilities. 
Furthermore, and in contradiction to the UK’s longstanding opposition, they have agreed to 
establish a new command centre for EU military training and advisory missions - the military 
planning and conduct capability (MPCC).  
Consequently, for the UK, a decision on future EU–UK security and defence collaboration is 
not just about continuing existing collaboration, but also about the degree to which Britain 
wishes to be involved in projects which it will no longer have a role in defining. As outlined 
above, Prime Minister May has made a close EU–UK security relationship a key UK 
objective. UK parliamentary and political opposition to a close future security partnership has 
been negligible, with significant enthusiasm for sustained EU–UK linkage in this area. 
Furthermore, the EU27 governments and commentators have also stressed the prospective 
implications for the EU of losing the UK’s security and defence policy capabilities as a 
consequence of Brexit.42  
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Divergence in the UK’s Brexit negotiating position between the aspiration for a security 
relationship as close as possible to member-state status and the desire for a more detached 
future political economy relationship with the EU provides a hint on a future UK strategy for 
influencing the EU as a third country. This might see the UK balancing elements of a proxy 
influence, through a less integrated relationship with the EU, with elements of a direct 
relationship, with a more integrated approach. In such areas as single market regulation, 
eurozone management and EU trade policy the UK will seek proxy influence on EU policy 
formation through member-state national capitals, complemented by diplomatic activity in 
Brussels. In other areas the UK may seek a more directly connected approach; these will be 
areas where direct, tangible engagement with the EU is politically tenable, where objectives 
appear to be of mutual advantage and where the financial costs (to the UK) are modest. Areas 
that lend themselves to the latter approach would include foreign and security policy. 
However, the complexity of implementing such a combined proxy and connected approach, 
both for the UK and for the EU’s member states, is already evident in the current 
arrangements in the area of external relations. Alongside foreign and security policy, the 
UK's external relations also encompass a wide variety of areas including trade, aid, 
environment, energy, development policy, immigration, border management, asylum, cross-
border policing and justice policies, all of which are currently intertwined with EU policies.  
Cooperation in security and defence policy is also an area in which EU member states retain 
significant autonomy. The UK already has an existing set of security and defence 
relationships with other EU member states which lie outside the framework of the EU. These 
include key strategic bilateral security relationships (notably with France) and bilateral 
operational military collaborations. The UK also has significant bilateral security and defence 
relationships driven by its NATO commitments (such as the Joint Expeditionary Force) and 
collaborations via coalitions of the willing (e.g. the Combined Joint Task Force conducting 
Operation Inherent Resolve). 
The network of security and defence relationships that the UK has with states outside the EU 
framework have already been targeted for enhancement since June 2016. In these areas (and 
in development policy), there is likely to be an expansion of state-to-state bilateral, trilateral, 
mini- and multilateral relationships. Beyond security policy the UK is likely to seek to 
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influence the EU by favouring different depths of relationship with different member states 
across different issue areas in an attempt to maximize influence over the EU agenda issues.  
London–Berlin–Paris 
France and Germany have remained in lockstep on the issue of Brexit and the future EU–UK 
relationship. While both have held to the view that the UK could reverse its Brexit decision, 
they have also buttressed Mr Barnier’s strength in the EU negotiations by maintaining the 
position that the UK’s position as a third country should be close, but should not confer the 
benefits of membership as a non-member state. 
The Brexit negotiations have demonstrated the extent to which both France and Germany 
have kept a firewall between the EU–UK negotiations and their broader bilateral and foreign 
policy relationships with the UK. Despite the expectations of some UK politicians that 
Chancellor Angela Merkel would intervene in the withdrawal agreement negotiations to 
create more advantageous terms for the UK, Germany has consistently supported Mr Barnier 
and the EU negotiating mandate. The Chancellor and other German ministers have publicly 
and privately maintained the position that the integrity of the EU’s single market is to be 
preserved, with no ‘cherry picking’ for the UK allowed. Germany has not been willing to 
contemplate any suggestion that the UK could deviate from any of the single market’s four 
core principles of freedom of movement for labour, capital, goods and services (or the legal 
framework including the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice that underpins these 
arrangements) while retaining the same level of market access for UK businesses and citizens 
it enjoys as a member state.  
As demonstrated during David Cameron’s renegotiation of the terms of UK membership in 
2015, Germany has sought to preserve a businesslike relationship with the UK but been 
unwilling to compromise on its core commitment to the integrity of the European integration 
process. This has meant that the UK has been discounted as a strategic partner within the EU 
while remaining a key interlocutor on foreign, security and defence policy issues outside the 
EU framework. The German approach also demonstrates how future Anglo-German relations 
will be circumscribed. Since the Brexit vote Germany has been keen to see the UK remain 
onside on key foreign policy issues and has been encouraging on the development of bilateral 
defence ties, but has also promoted the deepening of security and defence policy within the 
EU which has been facilitated by the UK’s impending departure from the EU.  
The future relationships between Britain, France and Germany will also be significantly 
determined by Franco-German views on the future priorities for the EU and by domestic 
political change in both states. The recent Franco-German agreement of the Aachen Treaty 
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represents a ‘renewal of vows’ rather than a shared clear agenda for the EU’s future 
direction.43 French President Emmanuel Macron has set out an extensive and ambitious 
agenda for which he has received lukewarm support in Germany. Mr Macron has also offered 
a more developed vision of how non-member states, including the UK, would fit into a future 
architecture of European cooperation.44 The absence of much convergence of view between 
France and Germany on a substantive future agenda for the EU may have mixed 
consequences for the UK. The UK’s interest in a stable EU may not be best served by a 
dysfunctional Franco-German dyad. However, past British European diplomatic strategy has 
also looked to strengthen bilateral relationships with France and Germany in areas where 
those two countries’ interests are not seen to be fully congruent. Notably, the depth of the 
relationship created in Franco-British defence ties through the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties 
is not matched by any equivalent partnership in any area of the Anglo-German relationship. 
Mrs Merkel’s announcement that she will depart as Chancellor in 2021, following a 
succession of poor election results for her CDU party, has put Germany into a period of 
political transition that complicates building post-Brexit Anglo-German relations. 
France, Germany and the UK have been careful to preserve foreign policy cooperation since 
June 2016 with policy towards Iran, via the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and Russia, 
over the Skripal poisonings, marked by significant unanimity. However, as demonstrated by 
the UK’s exclusion from the Normandy format contact group of Germany, France, Russia 
and Ukraine, intended to resolve the war in eastern Ukraine, there is no automatic impulse to 
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include the UK in contact groups on key security issues.45 As the relationship between the 
UK, France and Germany extends beyond EU issues and into other forums such as the G7, 
NATO and the UN, a new triadic relationship between the UK, France and Germany will 
emerge. However, whether it gives rise to a new trilateral formal institutional format or 
operates more as a ‘contact group’ type of relationship convened to address specific issues is 
less certain.  
European bilateralism and minilateralism  
With the departure from the EU the UK loses direct access to a multilateral arrangement that 
has hitherto allowed for a very wide range of issues to be addressed with a significant number 
of European states.46 If the EU embarks on its planned future enlargements, the UK will be a 
member of a diminishing group of European states not seeking membership. The extent to 
which the UK compensates for the loss of membership with bilateral and minilateral 
European diplomacy is partly conditional on the scale and scope of the future trade, foreign 
and security relationships it strikes with the EU. 
For EU member states, cooperation with the UK will be circumscribed by the issue area at 
hand and the degree to which competences are exercised exclusively or shared with the EU. 
This will place limits on bilateral relationships on trade and market-related issues; border, 
policing and criminal justice cooperation; international environmental and development 
policy issues; and aspects of foreign policy. It will also condition relationships with non-EU 
member states that are either EU membership candidate states or members of the EEA, plus 
Switzerland, and that have aligned themselves to the EU’s single market rules or Schengen 
Area, or pursue collective trade agreements with third countries (the EFTA countries have 
negotiated their own set of FTAs with third countries). One key decision for the UK’s future 
foreign economic policy is whether it will seek membership of EFTA or pursue a free trade 
agreement with the EFTA states. 
The extent and depth of the EU–UK relationship will also condition the UK’s relationships 
with regional organizations in Europe, and with states and international organizations outside 
Europe. A key element here will be whether the UK does in fact, as is current UK 
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government policy, leave the EU’s customs union and pursue new UK trade agreements with 
third countries. The UK will be challenged in maintaining strong bilateral relationships with 
all EU member states and simultaneously pursuing a ‘Global Britain’ agenda outside Europe. 
Selecting a circumscribed group of EU countries for ‘special’ bilateral relationships may be 
invidious and counterproductive. The UK may fall back on the ‘promiscuous’ bilateralism 
approach it adopted as a member state forming temporary alliances in areas where it sought 
to maximize influence. An attractive proposition for the UK will be to resume a policy 
launched by Prime Minister Cameron and pursue formal political dialogue arrangements with 
configurations beyond the already established Northern Future Forum to encompass 
groupings such as the Weimar Triangle and the V4,47 to maximize the scope for engaging 
with the broadest group of countries in a resource-efficient manner.  
Circumscribed bilateralism 
The UK’s bilateral diplomacy with European states will take on a different complexion after 
Brexit. As the Brexit negotiations have demonstrated, the UK’s political and diplomatic 
energy is far more preoccupied with EU–UK relations than is that of the EU institutions and 
the overwhelming majority of EU member states. 
As negotiations move into a focus on the future status of EU–UK relations, the EU’s member 
states will have to clarify their own ambitions and expectations for their relationships with 
the UK, as the knock-on effects of Brexit on the power, alliances and influence of other 
European states start to become apparent. For the UK, a major preoccupation in bilateral 
relations will be how to influence the development and evolution of EU policies. The EFTA 
member states, especially Norway and Switzerland, provide instructive examples of the 
significant diplomatic salience of Brussels and other member-state capitals for European 
states outside the EU.48 A new UK mission to the EU will replace the UK Permanent 
Representation to the EU (UKREP), which terminates with Brexit in March 2019. The 
increase in personnel that has taken place during the withdrawal negotiations is likely to be 
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sustained in a permanent arrangement. The EU mission’s work will pivot to resemble that of 
the other existing 165 country missions to the EU in Brussels seeking profile and influence 
with the EU institutions as a third party. Brussels is also likely to see heightened para-
diplomacy by the UK’s constituent nations, with the Scottish government and Welsh and 
Northern Ireland executives boosting their presence.49 The existing machinery for managing 
the input of the UK’s constituent nations in policy-making towards the EU has been 
demonstrably deficient during the Article 50 negotiations, and new mechanisms for 
coordinating the UK’s position in future trade negotiations (including those with the EU) are 
likely to evolve.  
Brexit has already had a significant and direct impact on UK bilateral relationships with other 
EU member states. The most substantive impact has been on Anglo-Irish relations. The 
economic, societal and political links between the UK and Ireland that have evolved since the 
accession of both states to the EU in 1973 are challenged by Brexit. In particular, the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement (GFA), which facilitated an all-Ireland set of arrangements to allow 
for the de-escalation and mitigation of conflict within the divided society in Northern Ireland, 
is placed under significant stress by the prospect of border control arrangements being 
reintroduced between the North and the rest of Ireland. The issue of Ireland has also 
demonstrated the shifting relationship between the UK and the other 27 member states. The 
ability of Ireland, as an EU member state, to pursue its national interests by working to see 
these adopted as a key EU negotiating objective in the EU–UK Article 50 negotiations has 
been instructive for the UK. Ireland has also pursued the most developed national diplomatic 
response to Brexit of any EU member state.50 The issue of the ‘Irish backstop’, which 
dominated the final stage of the withdrawal agreement negotiations, has invested the EU27 
with a greater stake in the GFA and UK–Ireland bilateral relations than was the case before 
Brexit. The degree to which other member states will similarly be able to upload national 
interests into the EU position will condition the negotiations on the future EU–UK 
relationship. 
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Conclusion 
As a major European power outside the EU, the UK could, in its future European diplomatic 
strategy, seek to go ‘back to the future’. From the commencement of the formal European 
integration process in the early 1950s the UK response was first to stand aside from the 
process and create a competing arrangement in EFTA to promote trade liberalization without 
a commitment to political integration. The lack of support for political integration alongside a 
favourable view of trade liberalization quickly resurfaced in British parliamentary and public 
debate after accession in 1973. The status of the UK as the EU’s awkward partner derived 
from its lack of commitment to political union that was integral to EU membership. Once 
outside the EU, the UK could seek to reignite its pre-1973 approach of building a trade 
relationship with other non-EU member states by seeking re-entry into EFTA alongside a free 
trade or association agreement with the EU.  
The broader UK strategic ambitions for the European economic, diplomatic and security 
order, however, remain to be settled. The UK will be a major European state, with one of the 
continent’s largest economies and with significant diplomatic, defence and soft power 
capabilities, outside Europe’s main political organization. In leaving the EU, the UK will see 
its relationships with the other two large European non-EU states, Turkey and Russia, 
change. Anglo-Russian relations are at a very low point, and the recent Skripal poisoning has 
been interpreted by some commentators as an attempt to destabilize the UK at a time when it 
was suffering from political dislocation in the aftermath of the Brexit vote.51 Anglo-Turkish 
relations, too, will take on a new complexion with both states as non-EU NATO members, 
alongside Norway and Iceland which do not aspire to EU membership. Turkey has 
maintained an unenthusiastic position on strengthened EU–NATO relations that has acted as 
brake on the deepening of ties.  
The UK position on EU–NATO relations will be determined by the EU–UK relationship in 
security and defence policy. A failure to reach a modus vivendi and/or modus operandi may 
encourage the UK to use the development of EU–NATO ties as a channel through which to 
‘back seat drive’ on the development of the EU’s defence policy aspirations. The UK’s role 
as a leading member of NATO has been a complementary arrangement to EU membership 
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rather than a competing choice. Whether a UK view emerges that sees the EU as competitive 
to its European ambitions will be partly conditional on how Britain views its international 
position more broadly. 
The UK’s relationship with the United States may, however, prove the most significant 
determinant of the balance within Britain’s foreign policy between Europe and its broader 
international ambitions. During the EU referendum campaign, the Obama administration 
made very public interventions in support of the UK remaining within the EU. Since the 
referendum vote, and with the change of US administration, the United States has taken a 
much more equivocal position on the Brexit negotiations and the future EU–UK relationship. 
President Trump has praised the UK decision to exit the EU, offered the promise of a future 
UK–US trade agreement and offered a mixed verdict on the May government’s negotiating 
approach. His administration has not, however, publicly sought to intervene in the 
negotiations, nor has it offered a clear view on how it sees the UK–US partnership after 
Brexit.  
Events since June 2016 suggest that the UK’s route to a post-Brexit diplomatic strategy for 
Europe, and beyond, will continue to run through Brussels. Central to a post-Brexit European 
strategy will be determining the final form of the post-Brexit EU–UK relationship. This looks 
set to be the work of the best part of a decade. Moving from the referendum vote to the date 
of the UK’s departure has taken almost three years; the UK is committed to remaining in a 
transition arrangement for a further 21 months after its formal departure from the Union; and 
the negotiation of the terms and then ratification of a future EU–UK agreement may require a 
five-year period.  
A sine qua non for a successful post-Brexit European diplomatic strategy is a settled 
consensus in Westminster and Whitehall on the future relationship with the EU. This is not in 
place at the time of writing in January 2019, when parliamentary manoeuvring on the 
withdrawal agreement is predominant. The domestic politics of the UK allows for a range of 
possibilities over the next few years. A UK general election (next scheduled for 2022) may 
have the future of EU–UK relations as a contested issue. Moreover, as noted above, Brexit 
has the possibility to disrupt the union of the United Kingdom by strengthening calls for a 
Scottish independence vote and a cross-border poll on Irish reunification.  
Influencing the direction and agenda of the EU will still be an objective for the UK after 
Brexit. The UK is likely to maintain the same preferences for the broad direction in which it 
would wish the EU to develop. It will, however, be largely limited to influence by proxy. The 
UK’s interests in specific items on the EU’s agenda will be conditioned by the degree of 
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connectivity the UK has with the EU single market, EU trade policy and the EU’s foreign, 
security and defence policies. The future EU–UK relationship may generate different degrees 
of integration, amalgamation or detachment across different policy areas. 
After Brexit, the EU (and its member states) will most likely consume greater diplomatic and 
political bandwidth in the UK than was the case when the UK was a member state. With 
intra-EU diplomacy, a central component of the UK’s past European strategy, no longer 
accessible, the UK will fall back on extra-EU diplomacy.52 To continue to maintain influence 
the UK will need to adopt a more polycentric approach, working in Brussels, in EU member-
state capitals and with third countries to seek to shape EU policy in its new position as an 
outsider.  
The UK challenge in its relationship with Europe will be to balance a narrative that reassures 
the EU that Britain has a deeply engaged interest in the success and stability of the EU and a 
commitment to the security and stability of the international relations of Europe, while 
simultaneously signalling that it has a vocation to be more than a European power.  
Departure from the EU raises broader questions about the future of the UK’s external 
relations (most notably its foreign economic policy) beyond Europe. The most significant of 
those of its relationships that are in a state of flux is that with the United States. But, just as 
importantly, if the government’s ambition for a new post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ is to be 
fulfilled, it needs to define a new, strategically ambitious UK foreign and security policy: one 
that will make the UK no less secure through a high degree of cooperation with the EU, but 
also allows it to increase its international influence through greater control of its own foreign 
and security policy. 
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